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Could the American Psychiatric Association Cause 
You Headaches?  The Dangerous Interaction    
between the DSM-5 and Employment Law 
Douglas A. Hass* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since its first publication in 1952, the American Psychiatric 
Association’s (“APA” or the “Association”) Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM” or the “Manual”)1 has long served 
as the primary reference for mental health disorders not only for 
medical practitioners, but also for state and federal courts and 
government agencies like the Social Security Administration and 
Veterans Administration.  In 1994, the APA published the fourth edition 
of the DSM, or DSM-IV, with only minor “text revisions” in 2000.  In 
May 2013, for the first time in nearly twenty years, the APA plans to 
publish an entirely new edition.2  As proposed, the DSM-5 (the 
Association plans to abandon using Roman numerals)3 would 
significantly expand a number of existing psychological disorders and 
add several new ones.  The DSM-IV, like previous editions of the DSM, 
has long served as a primary authority for the legal community.  The 
new Manual is still somewhat of an unknown, both in terms of content 
 
* Labor and Employment Attorney, Franczek Radelet, PC, Chicago, Illinois; Associate 
Faculty, College of Business and Professional Studies, Ashford University; J.D. 2008, Indiana 
University Maurer School of Law—Bloomington.  Special thanks to my wife, Peach, without 
whom none of this would be possible or worthwhile.  An early draft of this Article was presented 
at the Seventh Annual Labor and Employment Law Colloquium hosted by Loyola University 
Chicago School of Law and Northwestern University School of Law in September 2012, where I 
received invaluable feedback from colleagues.  All errors and oversights are solely my own. 
1. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
(4th ed. text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV].  The DSM-IV is the current edition of the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.  Although the 
current version is technically the 2000 text revision (the “DSM-IV-TR”) rather than the 1994 
version of DSM-IV, legal and agency practitioners rarely differentiate between the two.  
Accordingly, unless otherwise stated, this Article will rely on the 2000 text revision and refer to it 
only as the DSM-IV. 
2. Press Release, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, DSM-5 Publication Date Moved to May 2013 (Dec. 
10, 2009), http://www.dsm5.org/Newsroom/Documents/09-65%20DSM%20Timeline.pdf. 
3. Press Release, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, APA Modifies DSM Naming Convention to Reflect 
Publication Changes (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/DSM-Name-Change.pdf. 
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and potential impact.  The APA originally published proposed 
diagnostic criteria and assessment instruments on the DSM-5 website.4  
The APA’s Board of Trustees subsequently adopted the final DSM-5 on 
December 2, 2012, but offered little detail in its announcement and 
papered over the closed nature of the Manual’s development.5  The 
Board’s approval did little to quell controversies over the DSM-5’s 
impending publication.6   
Significant proposed revisions to a wide range of mental impairments 
in the final public draft of the DSM-5 indicate that the legal 
community’s relationship with the DSM may be forced to change, given 
the implications that changes in the DSM-5 may have for claims under 
laws like the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (regarding claims 
of “disability” and requests for reasonable accommodations), Family 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) (regarding definitions of a “serious 
illness”), Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and even 
state statutes and workers compensation laws (regarding whether an 
illness is work related). 
The great weight given to the DSM-IV is often overlooked outside of 
the medical field.  However, as this Article explains, the DSM-IV’s 
definitions of mental disorders and their severity have frequently served 
as references for courts and administrative agencies looking to interpret 
statutes and regulations and to apply the law to factual scenarios.  Even 
if a DSM-IV-based diagnosis has not always presumptively meant an 
employee was covered under various employment laws, the legal 
community must not overlook the potential impact of the new DSM-5 
on employment laws.  The DSM-5 will likely impact whether 
 
4. DSM-5: The Future of Psychiatric Diagnosis, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.dsm5. 
org/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
5. See Press Release, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, American Psychiatric Association Board of 
Trustees Approves DSM-5 (Dec. 1, 2012) [hereinafter APA Approves DSM-5].  Notwithstanding 
the interaction described in note 4 above, and the criticisms about the closed and secret process by 
the DSM-5’s critics discussed in this Article, the APA’s press release nonetheless claimed that the 
DSM-5 development process was “open and inclusive.”  Similarly, although the press release 
claimed that “the DSM-5 Task Force and Work Groups reviewed and considered each response” 
from the public, and “made revisions where warranted,” it failed to describe any such 
considerations or revisions.  For example, the December 2012 release confirmed the removal of 
the “bereavement exclusion” from the definition Major Depressive, discussed in Part IV infra.  
This important definitional revision is unchanged from the last public draft criteria. 
6. See, e.g., Allen Frances, One Last Chance for the APA to Make the DSM-5 Safer, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/allen-frances/one-last-
chance-for-the-apa-to-make-the-dsm-5-safer_b_2294868.html; Peter Whoriskey, Antidepressants 
to Treat Grief? Psychiatry Panelists with Ties to Drug Industry Say Yes, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 
2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-26/business/36015527_1_drug-companies-
antidepressants-wellbutrin (discussing criticisms of the APA’s removal of the “bereavement 
exclusion”). 
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employees can bring claims under the ADA, FMLA, ADEA, and 
various state statutes. 
This Article discusses the major role that the DSM standards play for 
legal practitioners and the danger that overly expansive definitions of 
mental disorders could pose to employers and employees.  Part I 
discusses the history and background of the DSM and its development 
into a de facto legal treatise.  Next, Part II highlights the strengths and 
weaknesses of the DSM-IV as a legal text.  Part III then explains the 
dangerous interaction between the ADA Amendments Act and the 
proposed DSM-5.  In Part IV, the Article highlights the challenges and 
difficulties that certain changes—from a proposed “Mild 
Neurocognitive Disorder” to the inclusion of deviant behavior in the 
definition of a mental disorder—could cause employers, employees, 
courts, and even federal agencies in applying employment and disability 
laws, particularly the ADA.  Finally, to reduce the possibly unintended 
consequences of overly expansive definitions, Part V summarizes 
specific approaches that courts, employers, employees, and legal 
practitioners should rely on to reduce any potential confusion and 
burdens caused by the release of the DSM-5. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DSM INTO A DE FACTO LEGAL TREATISE 
Mental health practitioners, insurance companies, and lawyers 
practicing employment law, disability law, and other related areas, use 
the DSM and have elevated it to the level of a de facto legal treatise.7  
The Manual contains uniform psychiatric standards developed by the 
APA that define and classify mental and emotional disorders.  The DSM 
also establishes detailed criteria that medical professionals use to 
uniformly identify mental conditions, evaluate symptoms, establish 
diagnoses, and decide on appropriate treatment.8 
A. Early Development 
Prior to the 1920s, the psychiatric field often inconsistently applied 
diagnostic categories for mental disorders.9  The inconsistencies from 
practitioner to practitioner led to a movement to create a standardized 
framework for diagnosing mental and emotional disorders and to use 
uniform terminology and classifications.10  In 1928, the New York 
 
7. See infra notes 56–63 and accompanying text (discussing the extent to which professionals 
use the DSM within the legal community). 
8. DSM-IV, supra note 1. 
9. ANTHONY L. LABRUZZA & JOSÉ M. MÉNDEZ-VILLARRUBIA, USING DSM-IV: A 
CLINICIAN’S GUIDE TO PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS 13 (2d ed. 1997). 
10. Id. 
3_HASS 3/9/2013  1:33 PM 
686 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
Academy of Medicine held a National Conference on the Nomenclature 
of Diseases in order to address the concerns of this movement.11  In 
1932, the Conference published the first edition of A Standard 
Classified Nomenclature of Disease (SCND).12  The SCND’s first 
edition focused on standardizing and labeling severe neurological and 
psychiatric disorders that practitioners had identified in mental 
patients.13 
With the SCND, mental health practitioners could, for the first time, 
apply a uniform approach to the diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric 
disorders.  However, the SCND’s limited diagnostic categories proved 
insufficient to diagnose the range of mental disorders exhibited by 
soldiers returning from World War II.14  In fact, more than 90% of the 
symptoms that military psychiatrists observed in veterans fell outside 
the SCND’s diagnostic categories.15  To account for this broader range 
of disorders in World War II veterans, the United States Army and 
Navy sought to expand on the SCND standards.16  This effort 
culminated in the Veterans Administration’s creation of a separate, 
comprehensive psychiatric standard in 1946.17  Relying heavily on the 
Veterans Administration’s standard, the sixth edition of the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-6), published in 1948, for 
the first time included a section on mental disorders.18 
Once again, the psychiatric community faced divergent standards and 
terminology, including the SCND, the Veterans Administration’s 
standard, and the ICD-6.  In response, the APA established the 
Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics to review the differing 
standards.19  In 1952, the Committee published its findings and 
conclusions as the first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 14.   For instance, the ICD-6, discussed infra note 18, and the DSM-I, discussed 
infra note 20, created the first formulations of what is now known as post-traumatic stress 
disorder, or PTSD.  The ICD-6 termed the disorder “acute situational maladjustment,” while the 
DSM-I referred to it as “transient situational personality disturbance.” 
15. LABRUZZA & MÉNDEZ-VILLARRUBIA, supra note 9, at 14. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id.  Originally known as the International Classification of Causes of Death, the ICD’s 
sixth edition effectively supplanted the SCND.  History of the Development of the ICD, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/HistoryOfICD.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 
2012).  The ICD was subsequently harmonized with the diagnostic codes and terminology used 
by the DSM.  See WILLIAM H. REID & MICHAEL G. WISE, DSM-IV TRAINING GUIDE 6 (1995) 
(discussing harmonization between the ICD and the DSM). 
19. LABRUZZA & MÉNDEZ-VILLARRUBIA, supra note 9, at 14. 
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of Mental Disorders, or DSM-I.20 
B. Expanding the DSM: From DSM-I to DSM-IV 
The Association’s release of DSM-I, however, did not quell the 
controversy over divergent standards.  Instead, DSM-I introduced more 
controversy and confusion, in large part due to differences in its 
classification system and the one used by the ICD-6 (and, in 1955, the 
ICD-7).21  To address these concerns, in 1968 the APA and the World 
Health Organization’s Eighth Revision Conference published the DSM-
II and ICD-8 as a collaborative effort aimed at harmonizing the 
competing classification systems.22  The DSM-II, using a hierarchy of 
classifications that operated from the top down, divided mental 
disorders into psychoses and nonpsychoses.  It then subdivided 
psychotic disorders into organic versus functional categories, while 
separating nonpsychotic disorders into neuroses, personality disorders, 
and mental retardation.  Each classification acted as a subordinate of the 
one above it, mirroring the biological process of evolution (i.e., a top-
down classification system).23   
A taxonomy built to classify organisms in a single species was a poor 
fit for multifaceted psychiatric diagnoses.  The hierarchical 
classifications proved both ambiguous—the differences between 
neurotic and psychotic disorders were poorly defined—and overly 
restrictive—the classifications limited clinicians’ ability to diagnose 
patients with multiple disorders.  For example, under the DSM-II, a 
psychiatrist could not diagnose a patient with both an organic disorder 
and schizophrenia because they occupied different branches of the 
DSM-II’s top-down hierarchy.24  
In 1980, with the impending release of ICD-9, the APA again revised 
the DSM.25  The DSM-III eliminated the hierarchical classifications 
found in DSM-II and created new diagnostic categories centered on 
grouping disorders based on similar kinds of symptoms—including 
Mood, Anxiety, Somatoform, and Dissociative Disorders—in a 
 
20. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
(1st ed. 1952). 
21. LABRUZZA & MÉNDEZ-VILLARRUBIA, supra note 9, at 14. 
22. REID & WISE, supra note 18, at 4.  See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968) (stating that the goal of the ICD-8 
is to unify varying standards). 
23. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV OPTIONS BOOK: WORK IN PROGRESS 1 (1991). 
24. Id. 
25. REID & WISE, supra note 18, at 4; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III].  
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multiaxial system.26  Additionally, the DSM-III allowed for the first 
time the possibility of multiple diagnoses, further distancing itself from 
the hierarchies defined in the DSM-I and DSM-II.27 
To coincide with the release of the ICD-10, the APA again revised 
the DSM in 1994.28  The DSM-IV, the most comprehensive diagnostic 
manual to date, made numerous changes and additions to the DSM-III.29  
For example, the DSM-IV provided for psychosocial and environmental 
problems that influence the diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis of 
mental disorders.30  These factors included major (often negative) life 
events, familial or other interpersonal stressors, and a lack of social 
support or personal resources.31  A major change in the DSM-IV from 
previous versions of the Manual was the addition of a clinical 
significance criterion to almost half of all the diagnostic categories.32 
II. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE DSM AS A LEGAL TEXT 
A. DSM-IV: A Critical Diagnostic Tool, but Not a Medical “Bible” 
Even before the APA began developing the DSM-5, the DSM-IV 
faced its own wave of criticism from scholars, particularly on the 
development of the diagnostic categories.33  Critics also complained of 
political pressure on the APA’s process for creating the DSM-IV.34  
However, and notwithstanding the deference that the legal community 
 
26. DSM-III, supra note 25. 
27. Id. 
28. REID & WISE, supra note 18, at 5. 
29. The Association had made minor revisions to the DSM-III in 1987.  AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. rev. 1987). 
30. DSM-IV, supra note 1, at 28 (provided in Axis IV). 
31. See Ruth Ross et al., Gender Issues in DSM-IV, in 14 REVIEW OF PSYCHIATRY 205, 209 
(John M. Oldham & Michelle B. Riba eds., 1995) (discussing the factors that influence the 
general treatment of mental disorders). 
32. See generally John M. Oldham, Personality Disorders, in 3 FOCUS 372 (2005). 
33. See, e.g., James J. Strain, Psychiatric Diagnostic Dilemmas in the Medical Setting, 39 
AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 764, 766–67 (2005) (criticizing attempts in the DSM-IV-TR and 
previous editions to develop diagnostic systems to categorize and explain mental illness); Dr. 
Randall D. Marshall et al., Review and Critique of the New DSM-IV Diagnosis of Acute Stress 
Disorder, 156 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1677 (1999).  See also HERB KUTCHINS & STUART A. 
KIRK, MAKING US CRAZY: DSM: THE PSYCHIATRIC BIBLE AND THE CREATION OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (2003) (broadly criticizing the application of mental illness labels to normal life 
processes). 
34. See, e.g., John Z. Sadler & Bill Fulford, Should Patients and Their Families Contribute to 
the DSM-V Process?, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 133, 134 (2004) (stating that the creation of 
DSM-IV-TR was hampered by lobbying and partisan politics); accord John Z. Sadler et al., On 
Values in Recent American Psychiatric Classification, 19 J. MED. & PHIL. 261, 261–62 (1994) 
(explaining that DSM-IV-TR authors paid little attention to value considerations). 
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often gives the DSM,35 the DSM-IV is simply a consensus-built medical 
text with the attendant limits.36  It is not a psychiatric “bible.”37 The 
APA appoints subject matter experts on a particular diagnosis to a 
committee and tasks them with developing a consensus on how the 
literature and research define the criteria for a certain diagnosis.38  The 
committees develop and revise diagnoses in each subsequent edition of 
the Manual based on research and clinical experience.39 
Accordingly, the DSM is useful when classifying patients for 
insurance, research, or treatment purposes.  The Manual serves 
physicians, patients, and insurers alike when evaluating whether a 
patient meets certain diagnostic criteria required for a referral, health 
benefits, or insurance coverage.  Researchers can use the DSM to treat 
patients dispersed both geographically and across multiple studies to 
ensure that they evaluate similar patients using specific, predefined 
diagnostic criteria—an important and obvious issue for treatment 
research.  The DSM-IV’s multiaxial assessment also increases the ease 
with which practitioners can evaluate patients with multiple conditions 
and stressors beyond a primary diagnosis using the Global Assessment 
of Functioning (“GAF”) score.40 
For legal practitioners, the DSM-IV helpfully defines a mental 
disorder as “a clinically significant behavioral or psychological 
syndrome” that is attendant with “present distress” or “disability.”41  
Importantly, this criterion requires symptoms to cause “clinically 
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning.”42  The DSM-IV also defines what is not 
a mental disorder: “an expectable and culturally sanctioned response to 
a particular event.”43  Furthermore, the DSM-IV excludes deviant 
behavior or conflicts with society from the mental disorder 
 
35. See infra notes 56–63 and accompanying text (discussing the legal community’s views 
and usage of the DSM). 
36. DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxxiii. 
37. Andrew E. Taslitz, Mental Health and Criminal Justice: An Overview, 22 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5 
(2007). 
38. DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxxiii. 
39. Id. at xxxi–xxxiii. 
40. See, e.g., Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 807 & n.1 (7th Cir. 2011) (defining GAF score 
as a “psychiatric measure of a patient’s overall level of functioning”). 
41. DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxxi.  But see DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxx (“[I]t must be 
admitted that no definition adequately specifies precise boundaries for the concept of ‘mental 
disorder.’”). 
42. See Robert L. Spitzer & Jerome C. Wakefield, DSM-IV Diagnostic Criterion for Clinical 
Significance: Does It Help Solve the False Positives Problem?, 156 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1856 
(1999). 
43. See DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxxi. 
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classification, unless the deviance and conflicts are symptoms of 
another mental disorder identified in the Manual.  As discussed in Part 
IV, the DSM-5 proposes to relax these important foundational 
definitions in many areas. 
B. DSM-IV: An Informational, Not Authoritative, Legal Text 
The DSM-IV, however, is not without its weaknesses.  More 
specifically, the sheer number of mental disorders encompassed by the 
DSM-IV can create confusion in legal contexts.44  A comparison of the 
DSM-IV with the DSM-I demonstrates one reason why: the DSM-IV 
lists 297 different mental disorders, or approximately 300% more than 
the DSM-I published just forty-two years earlier.45 
Unfortunately, the rapid expansion of listed mental illnesses was not 
the result of improvements in medical diagnoses.46  For example, the 
DSM-IV added seventeen new sexual disorders, “despite little to no 
empirical evidence of any underlying disease process that could account 
for their existence.”47  Other new diagnoses in the DSM-IV included 
personality disorders, which are pervasive and rigid patterns of 
maladaptive behavior.48  Rather than objective markers, the DSM-IV 
identifies personality disorders by “an enduring pattern of inner 
experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations 
of the individual’s culture.”49  Accordingly, psychiatrists must rely on 
subjective cultural standards to diagnose these types of disorders. 
Among several cautionary statements that implicitly recognize the 
 
44. In no way should readers conflate confusion in legal environments with confusion in 
medical or societal ones.  Mental illnesses are real and affect millions of Americans.  Sadly, 
Americans with mental illnesses still face numerous burdens and stigmas in society.  See Jane 
Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585, 586–87 
(2003) (describing stereotypes and stigmas associated with the mentally ill).  People tend to fear 
the mentally ill, discriminate against them, and view them as more likely to perpetrate violent acts 
than others with only physical illnesses.  Id.  Even after the passage of the ADA, group insurance 
plans can still provide more benefits for physical disabilities than mental disabilities without 
violating that law’s anti-discrimination provisions.  Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 
198 F.3d 1104, 1115–18 (9th Cir. 2000).  While I am of the opinion that wholesale reliance on or 
adoption of the DSM by legal practitioners may be dangerous, that opinion should always be 
viewed in a greater societal context.  Ignorance of the prevalence and devastating effects of 
mental illness is a serious issue that no legal analysis of the DSM can or should diminish. 
45. Compare DSM-IV, supra note 1, at 13–26 (listing all recognized disorders), with DSM-I, 
supra note 20. 
46. See Steven K. Erickson, The Myth of Mental Disorder: Transsubstantive Behavior and 
Taxometric Psychiatry, 41 AKRON L. REV. 67, 105–06 (2008) (tying illnesses to political 
pressures and theoretical factors unsupported by clinical research). 
47. Id. at 114. 
48. DSM-IV, supra note 1, at 685. 
49. Id. at 686. 
3_HASS 3/9/2013  1:33 PM 
2013] DSM-5 and Employment Law 691 
Manual’s limitations, the DSM-IV warns that the “assignment of a 
particular diagnosis does not imply a specific level of impairment or 
disability.”50  Therefore, an individual may be depressed, and even meet 
the DSM-IV’s diagnostic criteria for Major Depressive Disorder, but 
those facts alone may or may not result in a level of functional 
impairment warranting a medical determination of disability.  
Accordingly, a diagnosis of a mental illness under the DSM-IV cannot 
directly translate to a legal determination of incompetence, disability, or 
lack of criminal responsibility.  A murderer may have Bipolar Disorder, 
Major Depressive Disorder, and various psychoses, but still be found 
competent to stand trial.51  Of course, a DSM-IV diagnosis necessarily 
implies nothing about the treatment protocol for the mental illness—a 
diagnosis cannot inform a court whether medication or other treatment 
can help a person “control” their condition. 
The lack of clarity in the DSM-IV about how to define a mental 
illness,52 particularly when combined with diagnostic subjectivity in 
certain disorders, presents significant difficulties for legal practitioners 
who look to the DSM either to adapt medical terminology to lay, legal 
definitions, or to reach legal conclusions.53  Even Congress has rejected 
a statutory definition that would explicitly require group health plans to 
adopt all DSM diagnoses.54 
 
50. Id. at xxxiii. 
51. E.g., United States v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2012).  The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
a district court’s finding that Jared Lee Loughner, who shot and killed federal judge John Roll 
and seriously wounded Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords (among others) in January 2011, was 
competent to stand trial despite multiple mental disorders.  Id. at 772.  The district court had 
found a substantial probability that Loughner could be restored to competency through 
involuntary medication.  Id. at 770. 
52. See DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxx (“[I]t must be admitted that no definition adequately 
specifies precise boundaries for the concept of ‘mental disorder.’”). 
53. See, e.g., Pierre Beumont & Terry Carney, Can Psychiatric Terminology Be Translated 
into Legal Regulation? The Anorexia Nervosa Example, 38 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 819, 
820 (2004). 
54. As part of Public Law No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008)—a law best known for creating 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)—Congress passed the Paul Wellstone and Pete 
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA).  The MHPAEA, 
codified in relevant part at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006), requires insurance coverage for treatment 
related to mental health or substance abuse to be “no more restrictive than the predominant 
financial requirements applied to substantially all medical and surgical benefits covered by the 
plan” and eliminated disparities between co-pays and deductibles for mental versus physical 
illnesses.  The original version of the bill, introduced in March 2007, explicitly required group 
health plans to “include benefits for any mental health condition or substance-related disorder 
included in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
published by the American Psychiatric Association.”  H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (2007).  This 
language was removed prior to the passage of the MHPAEA.  
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C. Use of the DSM in Legal Contexts 
Despite these weaknesses and the DSM’s admonitions that the 
application of DSM-IV “categories, criteria, and textual descriptions . . . 
for forensic purposes,” rather than medical ones, raises “significant risks 
that diagnostic information will be misused or misunderstood,”55 the 
DSM-IV has found wide application far beyond doctors’ offices and 
medical journals.  Courts, legislators, and government agencies have 
relied on the DSM-IV as a persuasive text in a range of cases implicating 
mental illness, from employment discrimination,56 to criminal law57 
and Social Security disability,58 and even to health plan 
administration.59  Courts have referred to the DSM as a “nationally 
recognized directory of mental illness,”60 a “reliable text,”61 and 
“specialized literature” with a rigorous process for including mental 
illnesses.62  Courts have also held that government agencies can 
reasonably rely on the DSM-IV to determine eligibility for their health 
plans’ disability benefits.63 
Battles over the DSM and its proper meaning have even reached 
Supreme Court decisions.  For example, in Atkins v. Virginia,64 the 
Court considered the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on 
intellectually disabled/mentally retarded defendants.  Writing for the 
 
55. DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxxii–xxxiii. 
56. See, e.g., Scheerer v. Potter, 443 F.3d 916, 920–21 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting 
“disability” in Rehabilitation Act claim in part because of the DSM-IV definition of adjustment 
disorder); Boldini v. Postmaster Gen., 928 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.N.H. 1995) (stating, under 
section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, that “in circumstances of mental impairment, a court may 
give weight to a diagnosis of mental impairment which is described in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association”); Guice-Mills v. 
Derwinski, 772 F. Supp. 188, 197–98 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“A major depressive episode as described 
in the [DSM-IV] constitutes ‘mental impairment’ [under the Rehabilitation Act].”), aff’d, 967 F.2d 
794 (2d Cir. 1992). 
57. See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 774 (2006) (citing DSM-IV’s diagnostic 
definition of Schizophrenia in a case regarding state insanity defense standards). 
58. See, e.g., Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 807 n.1 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing the DSM-IV 
definition of a GAF score—a “psychiatric measure of a patient’s overall level of functioning”—in 
a disability case involving mental impairments). 
59. See Fuller v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 423 F.3d 104, 105–06 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing a 
disability plan’s reliance on DSM-IV definitions when making disability coverage 
determinations). 
60. Pandazides v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 804 F. Supp. 794, 803 (E.D. Va. 1992), rev’d on other 
grounds, 13 F.3d 823 (4th Cir. 1994). 
61. United States v. Danser, 110 F. Supp. 2d 807, 829 (S.D. Ind. 1999). 
62. Discepolo v. Gorgone, 399 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (D. Conn. 2005). 
63. Dellarcirprete v. Gutierrez, 479 F. Supp. 2d 600, 605 (N.D.W.V. 2007) (“[T]he BOP’s 
reliance on the DSM-IV to help determine the terms of eligibility is likewise reasonable.”) 
64. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
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majority, Justice Stevens referred to both the DSM-IV65 and the joint 
amicus curiae brief filed by the American Psychological Association 
and the APA.66  His opinion stated that “clinical definitions of mental 
retardation require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also 
significant limitations in adaptive skills . . . that became manifest before 
age 18.”67  In dissent, Justice Scalia focused on this definition and 
remarked that “the symptoms of this condition can readily be 
feigned.”68 
Thus, even at the highest levels, legal practitioners and legislators 
often rely heavily on the DSM-IV when making legal determinations—
in Atkins, to determine whether intellectual disability/mental retardation 
can be diagnosed in a defendant; for Congress, to determine the scope 
of coverage under group health plans.  This overreliance, however, is 
dangerous.  The DSM increasingly lists sets of “hypotheses, somewhat 
proved and somewhat unproved, that were reliably defined so as to be 
further studied and later further refined, proved, or disproved,” rather 
than listing disorders.69  Nevertheless, the seemingly blind obeisance in 
legal circles for the DSM results in practitioners, courts, and judges—
not to mention employers and employees—treating a DSM diagnosis as 
a proven fact with legal consequences, rather than the hypothesis that it 
often represents.70 
The DSM-IV actually cautions the legal community from attaching 
too much importance to the Manual when making conclusions of law 
and explains why heavy reliance is dangerous: 
These dangers arise because of the imperfect fit between the questions 
of ultimate concern to the law and the information contained in a 
clinical diagnosis.  In most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a DSM-
IV mental disorder is not sufficient to establish the existence for legal 
purposes of a “mental disorder,” “mental disability,” “mental disease,” 
or “mental defect.” In determining whether an individual meets a 
specified legal standard (e.g., for competence, criminal responsibility, 
 
65. See id. at 308 n.3 (quoting the APA’s definition of Mental Retardation). 
66. See id. at 316 n.21 (citing the APA’s amicus curiae brief opposing the imposition of the 
death penalty on offenders diagnosed with mental retardation). 
67. Id. at 318. 
68. Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
69. S. NASSIR GHAEMI, THE CONCEPTS OF PSYCHIATRY: A PLURALISTIC APPROACH TO THE 
MIND AND MENTAL ILLNESS 172 (2003). 
70. See, e.g., id. at 53 (discussing the difficulty in reconciling psychiatry and empiricism); 
Philip Thomas et al., Explanatory Models for Mental Illness: Limitations and Dangers in a 
Global Context, 2 PAK. J. NEUROL. SCI. 176, 177 (2007) (discussing the lack of evidence that 
links psychiatric disorders to biology); John Sorboro, The Trouble with Psychiatry, SKEPTIC 
MAG., Sept. 22, 2007, at 37, 38–39 (explaining that there is not much “real evidence” to support 
the claim that psychiatric disorders can be explained through biology). 
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or disability), additional information is usually required beyond that 
contained in the DSM-IV diagnosis.71 
The danger of overreliance on the DSM comes into clearer focus with 
the expected May 2013 release of the DSM-5.  To better understand this 
danger, Part III presents a primer on the changes to the ADA under the 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”),72 with a focus on mental 
impairments.  Part IV then describes the potentially dangerous 
interaction between the ADAAA and the DSM-5. 
III. THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT’S DANGEROUS INTERACTION               
WITH THE DSM 
A. Key Changes in the ADAAA 
On September 25, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the 
ADAAA into law.73  The Act’s most significant changes affected the 
ADA’s treatment of what constitutes a “disability” and the ADA’s 
definitions of “substantial limitations,” “major life activities,” and 
“regarded as” disability.  The ADAAA primarily addressed issues from 
two ADA-related U.S. Supreme Court cases: Sutton v. United Air 
Lines74 and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.75 
Sutton addressed disability discrimination claims made by two 
severely myopic plaintiffs who were denied employment for failing to 
satisfy minimum vision requirements based on uncorrected visual 
acuity.76  The Court held that any measures that an individual takes to 
mitigate a physical or mental impairment must be considered when 
determining whether an individual is “disabled.”77  Subsequent district 
and appellate court decisions relied on Sutton to find that some mental 
impairments did not constitute “disabilities” where they were 
adequately controlled by medication.78 
 
71. DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxxiii. 
72. See generally ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 8, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–02, 12112, 12201, 12206, & 12211 (2006)) [hereinafter 
“ADAAA”]. 
73. Id.  The Act took effect in January 2009. 
74. 527 U.S. 471 (1999), overturned by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 
122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
75. 534 U.S. 184 (2002), overturned by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 
122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
76. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475–76. 
77. Id. at 482. 
78. See, e.g., Collins v. Prudential Inv. and Ret. Servs., 119 F. App’x 371, 378 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(noting that ADD/ADHD is not a “disability” when it is corrected through medication); EEOC v. 
Rite Aid Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 564, 570–71 (D. Md. 2010) (same with epilepsy); Burke v. 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 142 F. App’x 527, 529 (2d Cir. 2005) (same with asthma). 
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Toyota considered whether an employer had failed to accommodate a 
claim by a plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome.79  The Court held that 
an impairment must “prevent” or “severely restrict” a major life activity 
to constitute a “substantial limitation” on that activity,80 and that a 
“major life activity” must be an activity “of central importance to daily 
life.”81  Prior to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
(EEOC) publication of post-ADAAA regulations in March 2011,82 
ADA regulations had narrowly defined terms like “substantially limits” 
as “unable to perform” a major life activity or “significantly restricted” 
in the performance of that activity.83 
The ADAAA also allowed Congress to resolve additional 
controversies raised by Court dicta, lower court decisions, and circuit 
splits among the appellate courts.  Pre-ADAAA courts had divided over 
the issue of whether individuals covered under the ADA’s “regarded as” 
disabled prong were entitled to reasonable accommodations.84  
Appellate courts had also split over whether plaintiffs who claimed they 
were “regarded as” disabled also must prove that defendants had 
perceived those real or imagined disabilities as “substantially 
limiting.”85 
Pre-ADAAA Court law also required a mental (or physical) 
impairment to have a “permanent or long term” impact.86  Accordingly, 
many district and circuit courts declined to find that an impairment 
substantially limited a plaintiff if the impairment was merely episodic or 
in remission.87  Some courts went further and found that episodic or 
intermittent mental disorders did not constitute a “disability” under the 
 
79. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 187. 
80. Id. at 185.  Some pre-ADAAA courts held or implied that plaintiffs must have been 
substantially limited in more than one major life activity to be considered “disabled” under the 
ADA.  See, e.g., Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 231 F. App’x 874, 877 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(noting that the ability to drive a car might be inconsistent with an alleged disability affecting the 
major life activities of thinking and communicating); Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Ctr., Inc., 443 
F.3d 762, 766–67 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding a plaintiff with cerebral palsy as not “disabled” where 
she was not restricted in the ability to perform a “broad range of manual tasks”). 
81. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 185. 
82. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1–1630.16 (2012). 
83. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)–(ii) (2002). 
84. E.g., D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005) (discussing 
circuit split). 
85. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 490–91 (1999). 
86. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 185. 
87. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 2001) (“To hold that a 
person is disabled whenever that individual suffers from an occasional manifestation of an illness 
would expand the contours of the ADA beyond all bounds.”). 
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ADA.88 
Pre-ADAAA courts often questioned whether “working” could 
qualify as a major life activity.89  Although the regulations deemed 
“working” as a major life activity, they required plaintiffs to clear the 
significant hurdle of demonstrating that their impairments substantially 
limited their abilities to perform a “class of jobs” or a “broad range of 
jobs in various classes.”90 
B. Changes to the Legal Landscape in the ADAAA 
1. “Disability” 
The ADAAA rejected the Sutton Court’s holding, which required 
employers, under the ADA, to assess a “disability” in light of measures 
that mitigated mental (or physical) impairments.91  Instead, the Act 
required this assessment to be made without regard to the effects of 
mitigating measures.92  The ADAAA further clarified that an 
impairment need not substantially limit more than one major life 
activity to constitute a “disability.”93  Importantly for mental illnesses, 
the Act provided that an episodic or intermittent impairment would still 
constitute a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity 
when active.94  Helpfully, Congress listed several examples of 
mitigating measures that must not be considered in determining whether 
a mental impairment constitutes a “disability,” including “medication” 
and “learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications.”95 
2. “Substantially Limits” 
The ADAAA also rejected the Toyota Court’s holding that the ADA 
required an impairment to “prevent” or “severely restrict” a major life 
activity to constitute a “substantial limitation” on that activity.96  The 
 
88. See, e.g., Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 276 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(noting that plaintiff with depression and PTSD was not substantially limited in interacting with 
others where PTSD flashback episodes were “sporadic and last[ed], at most, thirty minutes”). 
89. See, e.g., Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200 (noting the “conceptual difficulties inherent in the 
argument that working could be a major life activity”); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 (noting that 
defining “major life activities” to include work may cause some conceptual difficulty). 
90. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2002). 
91. See generally ADAAA, § 8 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–02, 12112, 12201, 12206, & 
12211 (2006)). 
92. Id. § 2(b)(2).  The ADAAA did grant exceptions for the effects of eyeglasses or contact 
lenses.  See id. § 4(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(ii)). 
93. See id. § 4(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(C)). 
94. See id. § 4(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D)). 
95. See id. § 4(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)). 
96. See id. § 2(b)(4). 
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Act also rejected the regulations’ narrow definition of “substantially 
limits” as meaning “significantly restricted” in the performance of a 
major life activity.97  Instead, the ADAAA specifically directed that the 
definition of “disability” be construed “in favor of broad coverage,” 
consistent with the Act’s findings and purposes.98  Further clarifying 
Congress’s intent to return the ADA to its original understanding, the 
Act’s findings and purposes recited that the question of “whether an 
individual’s impairment constitutes a disability should not demand 
extensive analysis.”99  The Act’s findings and purposes also reflected 
Congress’s expectation that the EEOC would revise the definition of 
“substantially limits.”100 
3. “Major Life Activity” 
Third, the ADAAA rejected Toyota’s holding that a “major life 
activity” must be one of “central importance to most people’s daily 
lives.”101  Instead, the Act provided two non-exclusive lists of “major 
life activities”102—one containing traditional activities that the EEOC’s 
regulations previously recognized (plus a few activities only identified 
in court decisions and EEOC guidance),103 and a second list of “major 
bodily functions,” including “functions of the immune system, normal 
cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, 
circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”104  For individuals 
with mental impairments, Congress helpfully included multiple 
potentially relevant “major life activities” and “major bodily functions,” 
including sleeping, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and 
neurological and brain functions.105 
4. “Regarded as” Disability 
Finally, the ADAAA rejected federal courts’ requirement that 
plaintiffs alleging “regarded as” disability prove that defendants 
perceived their real or imagined disabilities to be “substantially 
 
97. See id. § 2(b)(6). 
98. See id. § 4(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)–(B)). 
99. See id. § 2(b)(5). 
100. See id. § 2(b)(6). 
101. See id. § 2(b)(4). 
102. See id. § 4(a)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)–(B)) (listing the activities that 
constitute “major life activities”). 
103. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2012), with ADAAA § 4(a)(2)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(2)(A)) (listing activities such as performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, and eating)).  
The ADAAA explicitly (and logically) recognized “working” as a major life activity.  Id. 
§ 4(a)(2)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)). 
104. See ADAAA § 4(a)(2)(B) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)). 
105. See id. § 4(a)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)–(B)). 
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limiting.”106  Instead, to satisfy this prong, the Act only required 
plaintiffs to prove that they suffered disability discrimination “because 
of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not 
the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”107  
The ADAAA also provided that employers need not extend a 
reasonable accommodation to individuals who merely satisfy the 
“regarded as” definition of disability.108 
C. Effect of the ADAAA Regulations 
For mental impairments, the ADAAA and its underlying revised 
regulations provide some different interpretations that changes to the 
DSM-5 could potentially exploit.  Most importantly, the ADA’s 
definition of “disability” after the ADAAA is to be construed broadly in 
favor of coverage and does not require “extensive analysis.”109  
Reinforcing the low bar for the initial steps, the regulations state that an 
impairment is a disability if it “substantially limits” the ability of an 
individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people 
in the general population.110 
The post-ADAAA regulations prescribe that an impairment that is 
episodic or in remission is a “disability” if it would substantially limit a 
major life activity when active.111  This broader definition is critical to 
proposed DSM-5 classifications of illnesses, such as Major Depressive 
Disorder, which include episodic events like bereavement.  Even 
impairments with a brief duration can be “substantially limiting” under 
the revised regulations.112  The regulations also provide a nonexclusive 
list of such potential impairments, including Major Depressive 
Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, where 
it will “easily be concluded” that impairments limit a major life 
activity.113  The regulations also explicitly expand the list of major life 
activities, including the addition of “interacting with others.”114  This 
language establishes a presumption that many broad categories of 
mental impairments will meet both the disability and substantially limits 
prongs of the ADA analysis. 
Additionally, the regulations state that mitigating measures are not to 
 
106. See id. § 2(b)(3). 
107. See id. § 4(a)(3)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)). 
108. See id. § 6(a)(1)(h) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h)). 
109. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1(c)(4), 1630.2(k)(2) (2012). 
110. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). 
111. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii). 
112. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix). 
113. Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii). 
114. Id. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i). 
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be considered in determining disability.115  For mental impairments, 
this excludes the consideration of the effects of medication, learned or 
adaptive behaviors, or psychotherapy.116  An individual is “regarded as” 
having a disability if he is subjected to discrimination based on actual or 
perceived impairment, whether or not the impairment limits (or is 
perceived to limit) a major life activity.117  While an employer is not 
required to provide reasonable accommodations to individuals who are 
only “regarded as” disabled under the ADA,118 the post-ADAAA 
regulations add that “regarded as” disability discrimination may arise 
from adverse employment actions taken based on the symptoms of 
actual or perceived impairments, or on medication used to treat such 
impairments.119 
IV. BROADENING DEFINITIONS: THE PROPOSED DSM-5 
A. Medical Community Criticisms of the DSM-5 
After publishing text revisions to the DSM-IV in 2000, the APA 
began preparing for the development of the DSM-5.120  Just as the 
DSM-IV received criticism during its development,121 word of the 
DSM-5 was met with considerable opposition from various medical and 
nonmedical groups almost from the outset of the project.  For example, 
psychiatrist Paul Chodoff sarcastically suggested in the APA’s 
Psychiatric News that the DSM-5 should adopt his proposed diagnosis 
of “the human condition.”122  With “diagnostic criteria” that included 
disliking school, fidgeting, disobedience (for children), dissatisfaction 
with one’s sexual performance, unhappiness, shyness, getting angry, 
and playing the horses (for adults), Dr. Chodoff cynically wrote that this 
diagnosis would “encourage the quest for a drug to cure the disorder of 
being human.”123 His comments underscored the psychiatric 
community’s unease with the ever-expanding DSM. 
Even the confidentiality agreement that the Association required 
 
115. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vi). 
116. Id. § 1630.2(j)(5)(i), (iv)–(v). 
117. Id. § 1630.2(l)(1). 
118. Id. § 1630.9(e). 
119. Id. § 1630.2(l)(1). 
120. See DSM-5 Publication Date Moved to May 2013, supra note 2 (noting that the APA will 
publish a new edition of the DSM for the first time in twenty years in May 2013). 
121. See supra note 34 (citing scholarly critics of the DSM-IV, particularly in regards to the 
diagnostic categories). 
122. Dr. Paul Chodoff, Letter to the Editor: Proposed Diagnosis, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (Jan. 
21, 2005), http://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/newsarticle.aspx?articleid=108472. 
123. Id. 
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DSM-5 Work Group and Task Force members to sign could not escape 
controversy.  The agreement prohibited the disclosure of any written or 
unwritten information, including notes and discussions, relating to the 
members’ work on the DSM-5.124  In 2009, Robert Spitzer and Allen 
Frances, the Task Force chairs for the DSM-III and DSM-IV, 
respectively, excoriated the APA’s Board of Trustees in an open letter 
for allowing the DSM-5 leadership to “seal[] itself off from advice and 
criticism” and engage in a “secretive and closed DSM process” that 
“cannot function properly.”125 
Spitzer and Frances’s real fear, however, was the lack of quality 
control in the DSM-5 process that was already spawning “damaging 
public controversies.”126  Their 2009 letter warned that the DSM-5 
leadership had been “insensitive to the great risks of false positives, of 
medicalizing normality, and of trivializing the whole concept of 
psychiatric diagnosis.”127  Frances later warned that the DSM-5’s 
proposals could amount to a “wholesale medical imperialization of 
normality [that] could potentially create tens of millions of innocent 
bystanders who would be mislabeled as having a mental disorder.”128  
Other commentators cautioned that “diagnosis informs treatment 
decisions,” and that even “small changes in symptom criteria” could 
have “significant impacts” on treatment.129  Shortly after the publication 
of Spitzer and Frances’s letter, the APA pushed the DSM-5’s original 
2012 publication date back to May 2013, ostensibly to more closely 
coincide with the release of the ICD-10-CM (“Clinical Modification”), 
which is due in October 2013.130  The delay did little to change the 
direction of the DSM-5 or the wealth of medical community criticism.  
 
124. Robert L. Spitzer, DSM-V Transparency: Fact or Rhetoric?, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Mar. 
6, 2009), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/display/article/10168/1385346.  The Association 
responded that the agreement was designed to avoid “premature conclusion and misconceptions  
. . . that could damage the viability of DSM-V.”  Nada L. Stotland et al., DSM-V: Open and 
Transparent?: Response, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (July 18, 2008), http://psychnews.psychiatry 
online.org/newsarticle.aspx?articleid=111946. 
125. Letter from Allen Frances & Robert Spitzer to the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n Bd. of Trs. 
(July 6, 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/17172432/Letter-to-APA-Board-of-
Trustees-July-7-2009-From-Allen-Frances-and-Robert-Spitzer. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Allen Frances, It’s Not Too Late to Save ‘Normal,’ L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, http:// 
articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/01/opinion/la-oe-frances1-2010mar01 [hereinafter Frances, It’s 
Not Too Late]. 
129. Lisa Cosgrove & Harold J. Bursztajn, Toward Credible Conflict of Interest Policies in 
Clinical Psychiatry, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/display 
/article/10168/1364672. 
130. See DSM-5 Publication Date Moved to May 2013, supra note 2 (noting the planned 
publication of the DSM-5 in May 2013). 
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The delay and ongoing debate should have raised red flags for legal 
practitioners.131 
In June 2011, the British Psychological Society lodged a highly 
critical response to the proposed revisions,132 one that a host of other 
prominent psychological organizations and psychologists later adopted 
in an open online petition.133  The Society joined Spitzer and Frances’s 
earlier criticism that the general public was “negatively affected by the 
continued and continuous medicalization of their natural and normal 
responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly have 
distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which 
do not reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.”134  The 
Society warned that many of the putative diagnoses presented in DSM-5 
were “clearly based largely on social norms, with ‘symptoms’ that all 
rely on subjective judgments, with little confirmatory physical ‘signs’ or 
evidence of biological causation.”135  Like Spitzer and Frances, the 
Society saw a need for “a revision of the way mental distress is thought 
about, starting with recognition of the overwhelming evidence that it is 
on a spectrum with ‘normal’ experience,” influenced by causal factors 
such as poverty, unemployment, and trauma.136  The Society 
recommended that an ideal classification system should not be based on 
“preordained diagnostic categories” but rather should “begin from the 
bottom up—starting with specific experiences, problems or ‘symptoms’ 
or ‘complaints.’”137 
Amid the furor, Dr. William Narrow, the DSM-5 Task Force’s 
Research Director, responded to some of the criticisms in an interview 
with the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.138  However, his question-and-answer 
 
131. Indeed, it was the DSM-5 Task Force’s announcement of the delayed publication that 
first brought the disputes about the DSM-5 to my attention and the attention of my then-
colleagues at the Social Security Administration’s Office of the General Counsel, the office 
tasked with defending the agency’s disability determinations on appeal. 
132. BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOC’Y, RESPONSE TO THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC 
ASSOCIATION: DSM-5 DEVELOPMENT (2011), available at http://apps.bps.org.uk/_publication 
files/consultation-responses/DSM-5%202011%20-%20BPS%20response.pdf. The Society 
published an updated response in June 2012.  BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOC’Y, DSM-5: THE 
FUTURE OF PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS (2012–FINAL CONSULTATION): BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL 
SOCIETY RESPONSE TO THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION (June 2012). 
133. Open Letter to the DSM-5, IPETITIONS.COM, http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/dsm5/ 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2011). 
134. RESPONSE TO THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION: DSM-5 DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 132, at 2. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 3. 
137. Id. 
138. Q&A with Dr. William Narrow, Research Director for the DSM 5 Task Force, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/news/health/ 
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session with the newspaper only served to raise more red flags for 
DSM-5 critics and legal practitioners.139  Dr. Narrow explained that the 
DSM-5 was necessary because the DSM-IV, completed nearly twenty 
years ago, was “no longer considered up-to-date.”140  In response to 
ongoing criticism about the expansion of the DSM-5 and the fear that it 
would lead to the medicalization of normal experiences and the 
overdiagnosis of mental disorders, Dr. Narrow responded that the DSM-
5 Task Force had been vetting draft proposals against scientific findings 
and field testing.  He added that the Task Force had been focusing the 
DSM-5 to address “concerns” that the DSM-IV was too “biologically 
focused”141—oddly the polar opposite of major criticisms from the 
medical field and major media.142   Unsurprisingly for lawyers, Dr. 
Narrow responded with an entirely clinical focus to the DSM-5 criticsm, 
not a legal one.143  Dr. Narrow’s response demonstrates that not only 
will medical professionals have to live with the DSM-5 (for better or for 
worse), but so too will legal practitioners.  Members of the legal 
academy who have been invited to participate in the development of the 
DSM-5 have expressed alarm and concern at some of the “vague and 
unscientific” proposed modifications.144 Unfortunately, legal 
 
qa-with-dr-william-narrow-research-director-for-the-dsm-5-task-force-219825. 
139. See, e.g., Martha J. Zackin, Psychiatric Disabilities under the ADA: Proposed Changes 
to Diagnostic Tool May Result in a Broader Definition of “Disability,” LABOR & EMP’T 
COMMENTARY BLOG (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/labor-
employment-law/blogs/labor-employment-commentary/archive/2011/11/17/psychiatric-
disabilities-under-the-ada-proposed-changes-to-diagnostic-tool-may-result-in-a-broader-
definition-of-quot-disability-quot.aspx; Daniel Schwartz, With DSM-5 on the Way, Is It Time to 
Update Definition of “Mental Disability”?, CONN. EMP’T BLOG (Feb. 21, 2012), 
http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2012/02/articles/with-dsm-5-on-the-way-is-it-time-to-
update-definition-of-mental-disability/ (warning that Connecticut has specifically adopted the 
DSM definitions); Douglas A. Hass & Lisa McGarrity, Could the American Psychiatric 
Association Cause Employers Headaches?  The Potential Impact of the DSM-5, FRANCZEK 
RADELET (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.franczek.com/frontcenter-American_Psychiatric_ 
Association_Impact_DSM-5.html (providing a legal update to firm clients regarding the 
impending DSM-5 release). 
140. Q&A with Dr. William Narrow, supra note 138. 
141. Id. 
142. See supra notes 122–37 and accompanying text. 
143. See, e.g., Benedict Carey, Revising Book on Disorders of the Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 
2010, at A1 (stating that the modifications to the DSM-5 have effects in fields other than 
psychiatry, such as the legal and pharmaceutical fields). 
144. See generally RUTH COLKER ET AL., COMMENTS ON PROPOSED DSM-5 CRITERIA FOR 
SPECIFIC LEARNING DISORDER FROM A LEGAL AND MEDICAL/SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVE, 
available at http://dyslexia.yale.edu/CommentsDSM5ColkerShaywitzSimon.pdf (recommending 
that the DSM-5 Task Force reverse its planned elimination of Dyslexia in favor of “Specific 
Learning Disorder”); Ruth Colker, Guest Post: Learning Disability DSM-5 Mess, LEXERCISE 
(June 1, 2012), http://www.lexercise.com/2012/06/learning-disability-dsm-5-mess/ (stating that 
the proposed removal of dyslexia in favor of the “vague and unscientific term ‘Specific Learning 
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practitioners will have far less input into its development than practicing 
doctors. 
An editorial by Til Wykes and Felicity Callard, from King’s College 
London, neatly summarized the problems with the proposed revisions 
for the DSM-5: 
The current release for public consideration includes proposals for 
new diagnoses—including mixed anxiety depression, binge eating, 
psychosis risk syndrome and temper dysregulation disorder with 
dysphoria—where the symptoms are shared with the general 
population.  It is also proposed that the threshold for inclusion for 
some existing disorders be lowered, and a few (but not many) 
diagnoses are scheduled for removal.  Most of these changes imply a 
more inclusive system of diagnoses where the pool of “normality” 
shrinks to a mere puddle.145 
Several proposals not only risk misuse and overdiagnosis in various 
populations, but also create legal concerns.  The DSM-5’s proposals, as 
well as other formal disorders currently under consideration by the 
APA, could directly impact whether employees can bring claims under 
the ADA (regarding claims of “disability” and requests for reasonable 
accommodations), the FMLA (concerning definitions of a “serious 
illness”), and even the ADEA and workers’ compensation laws 
(questioning whether an illness is work related). 
B. Legal Difficulties Presented by the DSM-5’s Proposed Changes 
Against the backdrop of the medical community criticisms, proposed 
changes in the DSM-5 would medicalize as disorders a number of 
potentially work-related conditions that previous editions have never 
identified.  Official recognition of a disorder in the DSM-5 leads 
directly146 or indirectly to recognition of that disorder in claims made 
pursuant to the ADA, the FMLA, workers’ compensation, and other 
federal or state employment laws.  Among the troubling new definitions 
that the APA has proposed adding as formal disorders are Attenuated 
Psychosis Syndrome,147 Mild Neurocognitive Disorder,148 Social 
 
Disorder’” was “alarming” and could cause “tens of thousands” of individuals to lose disability 
classifications).  Professor Colker is a Distinguished University Professor and the Heck-Faust 
Memorial Chair in Constitutional Law at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. 
145. Til Wykes & Felicity Callard, Diagnosis, Diagnosis, Diagnosis: Towards DSM-5, 19 J. 
MENTAL HEALTH 301, 302 (2010). 
146. For example, Connecticut statutes explicitly refer to mental disorders as defined in “the 
most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders.’”  E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 4a-60(d), 38a-488a, 53a-181i (2012). 
147. Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/ 
proposedrevision/pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=412 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).  See also 
APA Approves DSM-5, supra note 5, at 2 (listing Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome). 
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Communication Disorder,149 and Callous and Unemotional Specifier for 
Conduct Disorder.150  Other changes slated for DSM-5 include 
significant modifications to existing disorders, such as Major 
Depressive Disorder151 and Generalized Anxiety Disorder.152  The 
APA is also considering the addition of other questionably supportable 
disorders that were suggested by outside sources, such as Apathy 
Syndrome, Internet Addiction Disorder, and Seasonal Affective 
Disorder.153 
1. Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome 
One of the most contentious new disorders of the new DSM-5 is 
Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome, a proposal that would greatly expand 
the universe of psychotic disorders officially recognized by the DSM.  
Under the proposed definition, Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome would 
consist of a combination of low-level psychotic symptoms, distress, and 
social dysfunction that could occur as infrequently as once a week, as 
long as the patient views them as “sufficiently distressing and 
disabling . . . to lead them to seek help.”154  In an early 2012 interview, 
Dr. Narrow indicated that the APA had estimated that nearly 80% of 
potential “attenuated psychosis syndrome” patients go undiagnosed 
under the DSM-IV.155  Official recognition of this new disorder could 
lead more employees to claim that normal, job-related stress has led to a 
DSM-recognized mental disorder.  With the ADAAA lowering the bar 
 
148. S 03 Mild Neurocognitive Disorder, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/ 
proposedrevision/pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=420 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
149. A 04 Social Communication Disorder, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5. 
org/proposedrevision/pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=489 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
150. Q 02.1 Callous and Unemotional Specifier for Conduct Disorder, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL  
ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/proposedrevision/pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=424 (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2012). 
151. D 01 Major Depressive Disorder, Single Episode, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http:// 
www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevision/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=44 (last visited April 2012); 
D 02 Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5. 
org/ProposedRevision/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=45 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
152. E 05 Generalized Anxiety Disorder, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5. 
org/proposedrevision/pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=167 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
153. Conditions Proposed by Outside Sources, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www. 
dsm5.org/proposedrevisions/pages/conditionsproposedbyoutsidesources.aspx (last visited Sept. 
27, 2012).  See also APA Approves DSM-5, supra note 5, at 2 (listing Internet Addiction 
Disorder). 
154. Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome, supra note 147.  Under the proposed definition, either 
practitioners or patients can document the existence of these symptoms.  Id. 
155. See Q&A with Dr. William Narrow, supra note 138 (advocating that formal recognition 
of Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome under DSM-5 “would mean a greater likelihood that clinicians 
will recognize the syndrome . . . and be able to follow the symptoms over time and intervene 
when needed”). 
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for what constitutes a “disability” or what “substantially limits” a major 
life activity, employees would receive significantly more protection 
under the ADA, the FMLA, state workers compensation laws, and other 
employment laws. 
To the APA’s credit, its most recent revisions after its third public 
comment period ending in June 2012 delayed the formal identification 
of two other disorders with employment-related concerns: Attenuated 
Psychosis Syndrome and Mixed Anxiety Depressive Disorder.156  In its 
final pre-publication update posted to the DSM-5 website, the Task 
Force recommended these conditions “for further study,” noting that 
they “require further research” before consideration as formal 
disorders.”157 
2. Mild Neurocognitive Disorder 
Among the most troubling proposed changes to the DSM-5 is the 
addition of “Mild Neurocognitive Disorder.”  Grouped with delirium, 
dementia, amnesia, and other cognitive disorders,158 the proposed   
DSM-5 defines Mild Neurocognitive Disorder as involving a “modest 
cognitive decline from a previous level of performance”—in other 
words, a modest decline in memory—not otherwise associated with 
another mental disorder, such as Delirium or Major Depressive 
Disorder.159  According to the proposed revision, Mild Neurocognitive 
Disorder does not interfere with a person’s independence or activities of 
daily living (including complex tasks), but “greater effort, 
compensatory strategies, or accommodation may be required to 
maintain independence.”160  Notably, the only “evidence” required for 
this diagnosis is the self-reported “[c]oncerns of the individual” or “a 
knowledgeable informant.”161 
DSM-5 critics have rightly argued that this definition is unacceptably 
 
156. Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome, originally named Psychosis Risk Syndrome, is 
primarily diagnosed in adolescents and young adults, so its implications in the employment 
context may be limited.  For a discussion of the issues raised by the possible identification of this 
disorder, see Allen Frances, Psychosis Risk Syndrome: Just as Risky with a New Name, PSYCHOL. 
TODAY, July 30, 2010, and Johnathan Fish, Overcrowding on the Ship of Fools: Health Care 
Reform, Psychiatry, and the Uncertain Future of Normality, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
181, 249–53 & nn.432–53 (2012). 
157. See, e.g., Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome (Proposed for Section III of the DSM-5), AM. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/proposedrevision/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx? 
rid=412 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
158. See Neurocognitive Disorders, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/ 
ProposedRevision/Pages/NeurocognitiveDisorders.aspx (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
159. See S 03 Mild Neurocognitive Disorder, supra note 148. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
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broad.  Allen Frances, for one, listed Mild Neurocognitive Disorder as 
one of the “19 worst suggestions” for the DSM-5.162  He argues that 
adding Mild Neurocognitive Disorder risks medicalizing predictable 
cognitive declines of aging.163  Nonspecific symptoms, such as a 
modest cognitive decline from a previous level of performance, are 
“very common (perhaps almost ubiquitous) in people over fifty.”164  
This definition creates the potential for millions of individuals, who will 
never develop dementia, to receive a diagnosis (or misdiagnosis) of 
Mild Neurocognitive Disorder.165  Although diagnosis nominally 
requires an objective cognitive assessment, even the DSM-5’s 
Neurocognitive Disorders Work Group recognized that truly objective 
clinical assessments may be problematic.166  Frances argues that even if 
primary care physicians do not ignore the need for a formal neurological 
assessment, such assessments would do little to prevent false positives, 
if, as now, it is designed to include more than 13% of the population.167 
The problems with misdiagnosis of Mild Neurocognitive Disorder 
extend beyond the medical context and into the employment 
relationship.  In distinguishing ADA and ADEA claims, the Seventh 
Circuit cautioned that old age “does not define a discrete and insular 
minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, 
will experience it.”168  The ADEA protects older employees from 
discrimination, but the ADEA “does not include any additional 
considerations for identifying ‘qualified individuals’ that might be 
analogized to the ‘reasonable accommodation’ language of the 
ADA.”169  However, the ADA carries with it a duty to provide a 
reasonable accommodation for a disability.  Older employees with some 
expected, age-related decline in cognitive performance could begin 
claiming job-related accommodations for these cognitive deficits using 
 
162. Allen Frances, Opening Pandora’s Box: The 19 Worst Suggestions for DSM5, 
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/dsm/content/article/ 
10168/1522341 [hereinafter Frances, Opening Pandora’s Box]. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. See S 03 Mild Neurocognitive Disorder, supra note 148 (“[S]ymptom reports may be 
unavailable or unreliable, observation may be less informative, the interpretation of objective 
assessments is complicated by variable premorbid abilities, and simpler assessments are likely to 
be insensitive.”). 
167. See Frances, Opening Pandora’s Box, supra note 162 (“[G]etting a meaningful reference 
point is impossible in most instances and the threshold has been set to include a whopping 13.5% 
of the population . . . .”). 
168. Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. & Univs. for N.E. Ill. Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 
950, (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000)). 
169. Detz v. Greiner Indus., Inc., 346 F.3d 109, 117 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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the DSM-5’s Mild Neurocognitive Disorder, thereby transforming their 
ADEA claims into ones under the ADA and pursuing redress for a 
phenomenon that all individuals could eventually experience. 
As discussed above, the ADAAA has already lowered the bar for 
what constitutes a “disability” or what “substantially limits” a major life 
activity. The proposed Mild Neurocognitive Disorder definition 
included the key phrase that “accommodation may be required.”170  
While commentators have rightly argued that the ADEA has failed to 
address the continued emergence of ageist stereotypes and associated 
discrimination,171 the “remedy” of pushing (eventually) every employee 
and employer through the ADA interactive process by default would 
create obvious administrative and logistical nightmares for both parties. 
3. Social Communication Disorder 
Another puzzling proposed addition to the DSM-5 is “Social 
Communication Disorder.”172  Categorized as a neurodevelopment 
disorder with language and speech disorders like ADHD, autism, and 
Tourette Syndrome,173 the proposed DSM-5 defines Social 
Communication Disorder as “low social communication abilities 
result[ing] in functional limitations in effective communication, social 
participation, academic achievement, or occupational performance, 
alone or in any combination.”174  Another one of the diagnostic criteria 
suggests that people with ongoing difficulties in verbal and nonverbal 
communication that affect the “development of social reciprocity and 
social relationships” meet the DSM-5 proposed definition.175  While this 
definition may fit individuals with forms of autism who otherwise fall 
short of the DSM diagnostic criteria for Autism Spectrum Disorder, the 
DSM Task Force defined it so broadly that it could also match just about 
any of the “geeks, sportos, motorheads, dweebs, dorks, sluts, 
buttheads”176 or other individuals in a workplace who might struggle to 
fit in due to their particular eccentricities.  With the lowered ADAAA 
 
170. S 03 Mild Neurocognitive Disorder, supra note 148. 
171. See, e.g., Judith J. Johnson, Reasonable Factors Other than Age: The Emerging Specter 
of Ageist Stereotypes, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 49, 49 (2009) (arguing that because courts, 
including the Supreme Court, are allowing employers “to interpose defenses that correlate so 
strongly with age that they can be used as thinly veiled covers for discrimination,” the protections 
afforded under the ADEA are still in danger despite attempts at reform). 
172. 04 Social Communication Disorder, supra note 149. 
173. See Neurodevelopmental Disorders, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/ 
ProposedRevision/Pages/NeurodevelopmentalDisorders.aspx (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
174. 04 Social Communication Disorder, supra note 149. 
175. Id. 
176. FERRIS BUELLER’S DAY OFF (Paramount Pictures 1986) (Grace, Principal Ed Rooney’s 
secretary, explaining to Rooney why everyone thought Ferris was a “righteous dude”). 
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bar, tens of thousands of employees and their employers could 
potentially and unnecessarily face the ADA interactive process (or 
decline to do so at great expense).177  Despite the above reference to a 
classic ’80s film,178 the concern about employees who do not “fit in” is 
not a trivial one in the workplace.  The management-side labor and 
employment law firm where I practice179 represents many employers 
who have specifically expressed concerns about managing employees 
with eccentricities and quirks.  Adding the possibility of an ADA 
discrimination claim to the mix of a harassment investigation, a routine 
disciplinary matter, or other employment issue unnecessarily 
complicates the employer/employee relationship at best, and leads to a 
parade of horribles for both employee and employer at worst. 
4. Callous and Unemotional Specifier for Conduct Disorder 
Another proposed addition to the DSM-5 is the obtusely named 
“Callous and Unemotional Specifier for Conduct Disorder.”180  The 
proposed DSM-5 lists this new disorder among disruptive, impulse 
control, and conduct disorders such as Oppositional Defiant Disorder 
and Intermittent Explosive Disorder.181  To meet the diagnostic criteria, 
an individual need only fail to “show concern about poor/problematic 
performance at school, work, or in other important activities” and seem 
“shallow, insincere, or superficial.”182  As with Social Communication 
Disorder, Callous and Unemotional Specifier for Conduct Disorder 
would medicalize what others categorize as part of the human 
condition.183  Conceivably, an employer that places an employee on a 
performance improvement plan because of the employee’s failure to 
correct deficient job performance could be met with threats of an ADA 
discrimination claim.  Again, using the DSM-5 as support, the focus of a 
performance plan could easily shift from rebuilding a successful 
employee/employer relationship to negotiating the employee’s exit, or 
worse. 
 
177. See generally Walter Olson, Revised DSM-5 Could Open Up Wider Legal Claims, CATO 
INST. (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/revised-dsm-5-could-open-up-wider-legal-
claims/ (highlighting some of the “serious legal risks” that employers face).  
178. See FERRIS BUELLER’S DAY OFF, supra note 176. 
179. FRANCZEK RADELET, P.C., http://www.franczek.com/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
180. Q 02.1 Callous and Unemotional Specifier for Conduct Disorder, supra note 150.  
181. See DSM-5, Disruptive, Impulse Control, and Conduct Disorders, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevision/Pages/Disruptive,ImpulseControl,andConduct 
Disorders.aspx (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
182. Q 02.1 Callous and Unemotional Specifier for Conduct Disorder, supra note 150. 
183. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text (providing satirical commentary on 
medicalization of the human condition). 
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5. Modifications to Major Depressive Disorder and Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder 
The DSM-5’s changes are not limited to the addition of disorders that 
skeptical courts could dismiss or ignore.  The APA’s Board of Trustees 
has approved the removal of the implicit “bereavement exclusion” from 
the diagnostic definition of Major Depressive Disorder, a disorder that 
consists of one or more Major Depressive Episodes.184  The DSM-IV’s 
definition of Major Depressive Episode185 specifically exempted 
bereavement or other events involving a significant loss, even when 
symptoms lasted the requisite two weeks.186  The DSM-5’s proposed 
criteria, however, reversed this definition, explicitly stating that the 
“normal and expected response to an event involving significant loss 
(e.g., bereavement, financial ruin, or natural disaster) may resemble a 
depressive episode,” and when combined with symptoms of other 
functional impairments “suggest the presence of a Major Depressive 
Episode.”187 
Under this new definition, individuals whose grief, a normal life 
process, resembles a major depressive episode (e.g., two weeks of 
symptoms such as a depressed mood, loss of appetite, fatigue, trouble 
thinking or concentrating, insomnia, and loss of interest in or pleasure 
from activities) immediately after a major financial loss or the death of 
a loved one would be properly diagnosed with Major Depressive 
Disorder.188 
This significant change will likely increase the diagnosis of Major 
Depressive Disorder and medicalize normal grief.189  Allen Frances 
labeled this change another of the “19 worst” in the DSM-5.190  From a 
legal standpoint, the DSM-5’s transformation of grief into a diagnosable 
mental illness means that employers’ “bereavement leave” policies may 
no longer suffice.  Instead, employers and employees could again be 
forced through the ADA interactive process, FMLA leave discussions, 
 
184. See APA Approves DSM-5, supra note 5, at 4 (announcing that the bereavement 
exclusion “has been removed and replaced by several notes within the text delineating the 
differences between grief and depression”).  See also sources cited supra note 151 (discussing 
Major Depressive Disorder). 
185. See Major Depressive Episode, AM. PSYCHOLOGICALASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/ 
ProposedRevisions/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=427 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
186. Id.  
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Frances, Opening Pandora’s Box, supra note 162. 
190. See id. (“This is radical and astounding change that may be helpful for some individuals, 
but will cause a huge false positive problem―especially since there is so much individual and 
cultural variability in bereavement.  Of course, grief would become an extremely inviting target 
for the drug companies.”). 
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and other unnecessary legal discussions. 
Another suggested change in the DSM-5 is to the definition of 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder.191  While the general criteria—
restlessness, anxiety and worry, distress, and impairment of social 
functioning—remain largely unchanged, the proposed DSM-5 lowers 
the threshold of these symptoms for diagnosis.192  First, the DSM-5 
reduces the required duration of these symptoms to just three months.193  
Second, the DSM-5 proposal reduces the number of different associated 
behaviors required for diagnosis.194  Under the DSM-IV, patients 
needed to exhibit three out of the following six behaviors: restlessness, 
fatigue, difficulty concentrating, irritability, muscle tension, or sleep 
disturbance.195  The DSM-5 proposal requires that patients only show 
either restlessness or muscle tension, and one of the following 
conditions: avoidance of activities, excessive time and effort to prepare 
for activities, procrastination, or seeking reassurance from others due to 
worries.196  Critics have characterized the rationale for these “radical 
changes” as “completely unconvincing” and “remarkably thin.”197  The 
proposed criteria not only significantly lower the diagnostic threshold 
for Generalized Anxiety Disorder, but the DSM-5’s revised list of 
symptoms seems difficult to distinguish from the normal anxieties of 
everyday life.  As with the confirmed removal of the bereavement 
exclusion, the DSM-5’s proposed identification of these everyday 
anxieties as a mental disorder would also force employers and 
employees into the ADA interactive process, FMLA leave discussions, 
and other lengthy and unnecessary legal discussions. 
6. Outside Proposals under Consideration for the DSM-5 
The DSM-5 has also proposed a significant change to the definition 
of a Mental Disorder to remove the DSM-IV’s exclusion of both deviant 
(e.g., political, religious, or sexual) behavior and primary conflicts 
between the individual and society from the definition.198  The DSM-IV 
 
191. See E 05 Generalized Anxiety Disorder, supra note 152.  
192. See id. (providing DSM-5 and DSM-IV definitions of Generalized Anxiety Disorder). 
193. Dr. Frances notes that the original proposal lowered the threshold to just one month.  
Allen Frances, DSM 5 Will Medicalize Everyday Worries into Generalized Anxiety Disorder: An 
Example of Sloppy DSM 5 Methods, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.psychology 
today.com/blog/dsm5-in-distress/201104/dsm-5-will-medicalize-everyday-worries-generalized-
anxiety-disorder [hereinafter Frances, Generalized Anxiety Disorder] 
194. See E 05 Generalized Anxiety Disorder, supra note 152.   
195. Id.  
196. Id. 
197. See, e.g., Frances, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, supra note 193.    
198. See Definition of a Mental Disorder, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/ 
ProposedRevisions/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=465 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
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logically excluded deviance and conflict from the definition, except to 
the extent they were symptoms of another, diagnosable dysfunction.199 
In contrast, the proposed DSM-5 suggests that a mental disorder can 
be the result of these factors, so long as they are not “primarily” the 
cause.200  Medical critics have observed that the lack of consensus as to 
the “primary” causes of mental distress could result in practitioners 
classifying sociopolitical deviance as a mental disorder.201  In most 
jurisdictions, political affiliation is not a protected class; a private 
employer can, in most cases, make employment decisions based on an 
employee’s political affiliation.202 However, if holding radical 
sociopolitical philosophy beliefs can establish a mental health disorder, 
then a Neopaganist203 could claim that his pro-racist, pro-Nazi beliefs 
are part of a mental health disorder and seek protection under the 
ADA.204 
In recent years, news reports have highlighted a British poll205 and an 
American Academy of Pediatrics report in the journal Pediatrics206 that 
discussed the empirically questionable “Internet Addiction Disorder.”  
Internet Addiction Disorder was originally proposed as a satirical hoax 
 
199. Id. (providing DSM-IV definition). 
200. Id. (using the same definition, but inserting the modifier “primarily”). 
201. See Open Letter to the DSM-5, supra note 133 and accompanying text.  The Open Letter 
addressed this deviant behavior change in detail: 
Taken literally, DSM-5’s version suggests that mental disorder may be the result of 
these factors so long as they are not “primarily” the cause.  In other words, this change 
will require the clinician to draw on subjective etiological theory to make a judgment 
about the cause of presenting problems.  It will further require the clinician to make a 
hierarchical decision about the primacy of these causal factors, which will then 
(partially) determine whether mental disorder is said to be present.  Given lack of 
consensus as to the “primary” causes of mental distress, this proposed change may 
result in the labeling of sociopolitical deviance as mental disorder.  
Id. 
202. See, e.g., Ill. Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-102 (2012) (defining protected classes); 
Mass. Gen. Laws c. 151B, § 4 (same).  See also, e.g., Nguyen v. Univ. of Mass., 846 N.E.2d 
1184, 1188 (Mass. Ct. App. 2006) (“[Massachusetts laws] do not provide protection for political 
beliefs.”). 
203. See generally HELEN A. BERGER, WITCHCRAFT AND MAGIC: CONTEMPORARY NORTH 
AMERICA 4, 45–54 (2006) (discussing neopaganism and its pro-racist and pro-Nazi sects). 
204. In theory, this definition could stretch further to “Birthers,” conspiracy theorists, 
Holocaust deniers, or any manner of sociopolitical beliefs outside the “mainstream.” 
205. John Joseph, Nearly Half of Britons Suffer “Discomgoogolation,” REUTERS (Sept. 1, 
2008), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/09/01/us-britain-internet-idUKL146220120080901 
(discussing a poll that “found 76 percent of Britons could not live without the Internet, with over 
half of the population using the web between one and four hours a day and 19 percent of people 
spending more time online than with their family in a week”). 
206. Gwenn Schurgin O’Keeffe & Kathleen Clarke-Pearson, Clinical Report—The Impact of 
Social Media on Children, Adolescents, and Families, 127 PEDIATRICS 800 (2011), available at 
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/early/2011/03/28/peds.2011-0054.full.pdf+html. 
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by Dr. Ivan Goldberg in 1995, modeled after the DSM-IV’s diagnostic 
criteria for pathological gambling.207  Despite the general lack of 
support in medical studies for this addiction,208 the APA is nonetheless 
considering adding the disorder category to the DSM-5.209 
As discussed above, the APA is also considering, or has explicity 
approved, the addition of conditions that outside sources suggested— 
such as “Apathy Syndrome,” “Internet Addiction,” and “Seasonal 
Affective Disorder”—as psychiatric disorders for further study.210  
Medical literature defines apathy syndrome as “a syndrome of primary 
motivational loss, that is, loss of motivation not attributable to 
emotional distress, intellectual impairment, or diminished level of 
consciousness.”211  If adopted, an apathetic, unmotivated employee 
would arguably qualify for ADA protection.  An employee who has no 
motivation to work on Fridays due to DSM-5-blessed Apathy Syndrome 
would qualify for entrance into the interactive ADA accommodation 
process with their employers if he or she can show an ability to perform 
the core functions of the job with a reasonable accommodation. 
V. LIVING WITH THE DSM-5 
Although the “recklessly expansive suggestions go on and on,”212 
they reflect a fundamental change in the DSM that may require the legal 
community to remove the Manual from its current lofty perch of 
authority.  The removal of the multiaxial system,213 and proposed 
 
207. Ivan Goldberg, Posting to PSYCOM.NET (Mar. 16, 1995 5:06 PM), http://web.urz.uni-
heidelberg.de/Netzdienste/anleitung/wwwtips/8/addict.html.  See also Anne Federwisch, Internet 
Addiction, NURSE.COM (Aug. 8, 1997), http://www.nurseweek.com/features/97-8/iadct.html 
(describing Dr. Goldberg’s spoof). 
208. See, e.g., John M. Grohol, Pediatrics Gets It Wrong about ‘Facebook Depression,’ 
PSYCHCENTRAL (Mar. 28, 2011), http://psychcentral.com/blog/archives/2011/03/28/pediatrics-
gets-it-wrong-about-facebook-depression/ (detailing lack of medical evidence to support the 
report in Pediatrics). 
209. See Conditions Proposed by Outside Sources, supra note 153.  At least one federal court 
has spoken on the issue of Internet sex addictions and denied ADA protection because of the 
Act’s sexual disorder exceptions.  Pacenza v. IBM Corp., 363 F. App’x 128, 131 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(affirming district court holding that sex addiction is not a disability under the ADA and that sex 
addiction symptoms do not put employer on notice of employee’s PTSD), aff’g No. 04 Civ. 5831 
(PGG), 2009 WL 890060 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2009). 
210. See Conditions Proposed by Outside Sources, supra note 153. 
211. Robert S. Marin, Apathy: A Neuropsychiatric Syndrome, 3 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & 
CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 243–46 (1991).  The DSM-5 website does not include definitions for 
these disorders, indicating that the work groups are “further assessing the evidence” before 
making a recommendation.  See Conditions Proposed by Outside Sources, supra note 153. 
212. See Frances, It’s Not Too Late, supra note 128 (discussing some of the “most egregious 
invasions of normality suggested for DSM-V”). 
213. See APA Approves DSM-5, supra note 5, at 2 (announcing that the “DSM-5 will move to 
a nonaxial documentation of diagnosis”).  For more information about the multiaxial system, see 
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changes like those described above, reflect the DSM’s continued move 
towards a spectrum model of mental illness.214  This involves the 
“clustering of disorders into illness spectra (e.g., psychotic, bipolar, 
cognitive) and extension farther into the softer ends of these spectra,”215 
meaning that the DSM will increasingly attempt to capture “the sub-
threshold (e.g., minor depression, mild cognitive disorder) or premorbid 
(e.g., prepsychotic) versions of the existing official disorders.”216  I 
agree with both medical and nonmedical critics who contend that the 
DSM-5 will create millions of new diagnosed “illnesses,” whether or not 
they exist medically (or legally).  Dr. Frances writes that it will be “a 
bonanza for the pharmaceutical industry but at a huge cost to the new 
false-positive patients caught in the excessively wide [DSM-5] net.”217  
Importantly, though, the cost also extends to the legal community. 
The threshold coverage issue of “disability” has been defined into 
virtual irrelevance under the ADAAA,218 the EEOC’s regulations,219 
and recent case law.220  As individuals learn more about the new DSM-
5 mental disorders and the ADAAA’s relaxed definition of “disability,” 
more individuals will request accommodation.  While the wider DSM-5 
net will undoubtedly catch individuals unfairly excluded from the 
interactive process under the DSM-IV and pre-ADAAA regimes, it will 
also attract others who want to game the system.  The regulatory impact 
analysis that accompanied the proposed regulations recited that as many 
as one million additional individuals may consistently meet the 
 
text accompanying notes 26 and 40. 
214. Frances, It’s Not Too Late, supra note 128.  See also Joseph M. Pierre, The Borders of 
Mental Disorder in Psychiatry and the DSM: Past, Present, and Future, 16 J. PSYCHIATRIC 
PRAC. 375, 378–79 (2010) (discussing the DSM’s spectral model in the context of personality 
disorders).  
215. Pierre, supra note 214, at 379. 
216. Allen Frances, A Warning Sign on the Road to DSM-V: Beware of its Unintended 
Consequences, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (June 26, 2009), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/print/ 
article/10168/1425378?printable=true. 
217. Id. 
218. See ADAAA, § 2 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006)) (reciting findings and 
purposes). 
219. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2012) (explaining that under the ADAAA, an 
impairment is a disability within the meaning of the statute where “it substantially limits the 
ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general 
population.  An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual 
from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting”); id. 
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) (“An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would 
substantially limit a major life activity when active.”). 
220. See Villanti v. Cold Spring Harbor Cent. Sch. Dist., 733 F. Supp. 2d 371, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 
2010) (“The ADAAA substantially broadened the definition of a ‘disability’ under the law, and 
explicitly overturned the Supreme Court's holdings in [Sutton] and [Toyota], which had defined 
the statutory terms ‘substantially limits’ and ‘major life activities’ strictly.”). 
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ADAAA’s definition of “disability,” costing employers as much as 
$235 million per year over five years for additional accommodations.221  
With the relaxation of the DSM-5’s standards, one million presumably 
unfairly excluded individuals may pale in comparison to the total 
number of newly “disabled” individuals under the DSM-5. 
Although the ADAAA, combined with the release of the DSM-5, may 
create significant uncertainty, the legal community can take steps to 
limit this dangerous interaction.  Regardless of the relative wisdom of 
the DSM-5 approach for the medical community, the “spectralization” 
of mental illness222 means that legal practitioners, including courts and 
government agencies, must take seriously the admonitions in the DSM-
IV223 (which will presumably carry over to the DSM-5) and remove the 
DSM from its lofty pedestal of authority.  Even though the ADAAA has 
drastically lowered the bar for determining a disability and when that 
disability substantially limits a major life activity, courts must retain the 
healthy skepticism of medical evidence that they employed in the pre-
ADAAA landscape.224 
Even under the ADAAA, medical diagnoses should not automatically 
qualify an individual for a legal “diagnosis” of disability.  It is simply 
not the case that most individuals diagnosed with impairments on the 
spectrum of mental disorders are disabled as a matter of law.  The DSM-
IV itself admonishes that because of the “imperfect fit between the 
questions of ultimate concern to the law and the information contained 
in a clinical diagnosis[,] in most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a 
DSM-IV mental disorder is not sufficient to establish the existence for 
legal purposes of a ‘mental disorder,’ ‘mental disability,’ ‘mental 
disease,’ or ‘mental defect.’”225  Instead, the DSM-IV reminds the legal 
community that, “[w]hen used appropriately, diagnoses and diagnostic 
information can assist decision makers in their determinations.”226 
As one court noted, “additional information . . . beyond that 
 
221. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, as amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 48431, 48437 (Sept. 23, 2009) (codified at 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1630 (2012)) (listing the proposed regulations to the ADAAA). 
222. See Pierre, supra note 214, at 377–79 (discussing the diagnostic spectra for mental 
disorders). 
223. See supra notes 33–40, 71 and accompanying text. 
224. See, e.g., Rolland v. Potter, 492 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (discounting medical 
evidence in light of plaintiff’s ability to perform work); Squibb v. Memorial Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 
775, 784–85 (7th Cir. 2007) (declining to infer certain limitations from medical evidence); Dattoli 
v. Principi, 332 F.3d 505, 506–07 (8th Cir. 2003) (discounting medical evidence in light of 
plaintiff’s ability to perform daily tasks); Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 186–87 
(3rd Cir. 1999) (same); Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir. 1999) (same).  
225. DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxiii 
226. Id. at xxxiii. 
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contained in the DSM[] diagnosis” is needed to determine whether an 
individual’s impairment meets any particular legal standard.227  
Although the statement was removed from the EEOC’s final 
regulations, courts should be reminded of the proposed regulations’ 
statement that disability determinations “often may be made using a 
common-sense standard, without resorting to scientific or medical 
evidence.”228  For example, in 1998, the Sixth Circuit noted in dicta that 
the “inability to drive in darkness is a common phenomenon that, if 
classified as disabling, would make most of the American population 
over the age of 45 ‘disabled’ under the Act.”229  As the DSM moves 
further and further away from ADA jurisprudence, courts must reassess 
their deference to it and return the DSM to its proper place as one more 
piece of evidence that assists, but not directs, the outcome of a matter. 
At the same time, employers and employees cannot rely solely on the 
court system to address these burdens.  In states like Connecticut that 
explicitly adopt the latest edition of the DSM as the foundation of 
employment discrimination law,230 employers and employees cannot 
avoid the consequences of the APA’s decisions.  Outside the courts, the 
“spectralized” DSM-5, combined with the lower standards in the 
ADAAA, will increase non-litigation costs for employers and 
employees because of the increased attention to the interactive process 
and the increase in employees requesting accommodation.  Employers 
must assume that most individuals requesting accommodation would be 
found “disabled” under the ADAAA or at least would raise enough fact-
intensive issues to lead to more extensive (and expensive) discovery, 
and even to trial.  As much as some employers may want to chuckle at 
the absurdity of an older employee seeking accommodation for Mild 
Neurocognitive Disorder, they still must pay more attention to the 
interactive process in order to minimize exposure for failure to 
accommodate claims and the uncertainty of litigation.231 
 
227. Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 155 n.18 (1st Cir. 1998). 
228. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, as amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 48431, 48440 (Sept. 23, 2009) (codified at 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1630 (2012)). 
229. Wade v. Gen. Motors Corp., 165 F.3d 29 (table), 1998 WL 639162, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 
10, 1998). 
230. See supra note 146 (noting that the Connecticut employment discrimination statutes 
explicitly refer to the APA’s ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’). 
231. Of course, even if employers have no legal obligation to accommodate certain 
employees, employers should still consider affording reasonable accommodations of some sort.  
Providing a reasonable, appropriate accommodation, whether legally mandated or not, is often 
simpler and more cost-effective than determining whether a legal duty exists and how to calibrate 
the appropriate accommodation to both the disability and the law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Regardless of what the APA’s Board of Trustees finally approves in 
the DSM-5, as a legal matter, prudent employers should assume that all 
but the most transitory and minor of impairments (the common cold or 
flu, a sprained ankle, or a pulled hamstring) will be found to be 
“disabilities.”  To fulfill their legal obligations under the ADA, 
employers should respond to all requests for accommodation, even if 
the diagnosed “impairment” seems ludicrous on its face.  Careful 
preparation for and engagement in the interactive ADA accommodation 
process will minimize exposure for failure to accommodate claims and 
focus both parties on the issues most relevant to post-ADAAA litigation 
(i.e., whether the employee is “qualified” and what motivations the 
employer has for its actions). 
This Article casts a critical eye on the proposed DSM-5.  The 
additions and general reduction in diagnostic criteria for common 
disabilities cited in ADA and FMLA cases, such as Major Depressive 
Disorder and Generalized Anxiety Disorder, should bear close scrutiny 
both as the May 2013 publication deadline approaches and as medical 
and legal practitioners begin relying on the DSM-5 in the coming years. 
 
